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Abstract: The trust is a creation of equity and the English Common Law which has not passed to 
civil jurisdictions. Among the different types, the testamentary trusts are created by the testator in the 
will to provide the benefits of property after his or her death. This article explores the issue of conflict 
of laws –jurisdiction and applicable law- and the cross-border testamentary trusts from the perspective 
of English Common Law. The paper highlights the obstacles arising in the application of the conflict of 
law rules in this matter and concludes that in order to avoid them an approach between the Common and 
Civil law systems would be desirable. In this sense, the introduction and recognition of the trust into the 
Civil legal systems, by signing and ratifying the Hague Trusts Convention, could be a first step toward 
achieving this objective, since it would allow to introduce specific conflict of laws rules for testamentary 
trusts into their legal systems, applying, when necessary, the mandatory provisions as foreseen in the 
Convention in order to ensure the application of the forced heirship rights recognised in the majority of 
Civil law systems. 
Keywords: trusts, cross-border testamentary trusts, conflict of laws, jurisdiction, applicable law, 
Hague Trusts Convention, European Union Law, English Common Law. 
Resumen: El trust anglosajón es una creación de los tribunales de equidad en los países del Com-
mon Law que no se encuentra regulada en la mayoría de los países de tradición jurídica de Civil Law. 
Entre los diferentes tipos existentes, los trusts testamentarios son creados por el causante en su testamento 
y, tradicionalmente, se han considerado muy útiles en la planificación sucesoria. Este artículo ofrece un 
análisis de la aplicación de las normas de Derecho internacional privado a los trusts testamentarios trans-
fronterizos –competencia judicial internacional y ley aplicable- desde la perspectiva del Derecho inglés, 
poniendo de manifiesto las dificultades que surgen y destacando la conveniencia de llevar a cabo una con-
vergencia entre los sistemas de Common law y Civil law en esta materia. En este sentido, la ratificación 
del Convenio de La Haya sobre la ley aplicable al trust y a su reconocimiento podría ser un primer paso 
que permitiese introducir normas de conflicto aplicables a los trusts testamentarios en los ordenamientos 
jurídicos continentales sin perjuicio de la aplicación de las disposiciones imperativas y de orden público 
previstas en el propio Convenio con el fin de garantizar la aplicación de los derechos de legítima previstos 
en la mayoría de las legislaciones continentales.. 
Palabras clave: trust, trusts testamentarios transfronterizos, Derecho internacional privado, com-
petencia judicial internacional, ley aplicable, Convenio de La Haya sobre el trust, Derecho de la Unión 
Europea, Derecho inglés.
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The trust and the civil law concept of ownership. 2. Forced heirship rights. III. Jurisdiction of the 
English Court over cross-border testamentary trusts.1. Jurisdiction under European Union legisla-
tion. A) Brussels I Regulation. a) Domicile of the defendant as general jurisdictional rule. b) Ju-
risdiction of the Court in which the trust is domiciled. c) Exclusive jurisdiction. d) Prorogation of 
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non-conveniens. IV. The governing law of cross-border testamentary trusts. 1. European Union le-
gislation. A) Rome I Regulation. B) Rome II Regulation. C) European Union Successions Regula-
tion. a) Exclusion of the trusts from the scope of the Regulation. b) Reasons for excluding the trusts 
from the scope of the Regulation. 2. The Hague Trusts Convention and the Recognition of Trusts Act 
1987. A) Introduction. B) Preliminary issues excluded from The Hague Trusts Convention. a) The 
validity of the will. b) The law governing the assets transferred to the trustee. C) Applicable law. a) 
The choice of law by the settlor as a general rule. b) Governing law in default of choice: the most 
closely connected principle. c) Trusts governed by several laws. d) Exclusion of renvoi. e) Manda-
tory provisions, overriding provisions and public policy. f) Forced heirship rights and the applicable 
law. g) Scope of application of the governing law. h) Multi-legal system states. C) Recognition of 
trusts. V. Concluding remarks.
I. Introduction
1. The trust is a creation of equity and the English common law which involves the notion of 
holding property on behalf of someone else. In the trust there is not an absolute owner of the property 
and, once the settlor has constituted the trust, some ownership rights are vested in the trustee – manage-
ment and control of the property –while others are vested in the beneficiary – the rights to benefit and 
profit1. Therefore, there is a division of the ownership rights between the trustee, who has the legal title 
to the property for the interest and benefit of the beneficiaries (legal ownership) and the beneficiaries 
who have the beneficial title (equity ownership). It has its origin in feudal land law of the Middle Ages 
where no person, apart from the Crown, was an absolute owner of land.2 
This institution has not passed to civil jurisdictions where ownership is an abstract concept 
which, contrary to what happens in the trust, requires the owner to have the right of disposition, mana-
gement and enjoyment of the property, in short, all the ownership rights3. For this reason, civil law states 
find it very difficult to give effect to a trust in their jurisdictions where this figure is unknown, although 
some concepts developed under the civil law jurisdictions have some features or characteristics of the 
trust, for instance, the fiducia.4
1  P. Mcloughlin and c. Rendell, Law of Trusts, London, Macmillan, 1992, pp. 3-4. 
2  S. PaneSaR, Exploring Equity and Trusts, Harlow, Longman, 2010, pp. 49 y 50, quoting J.L. BaRton, The Medieval Use, 
Law Quarterly Review, nº 562, 1965.
3  Nonetheless, this figure has been studied by authors in most jurisdictions. Thus, for references to the relevant literature 
in Spain Vid., among others, E. ARRoyo AMayuelaS (Coord.), El trust en el derecho civil, Barcelona, Bosh, 2007; M. A. ASín 
CabReRa, “La ley applicable al trust en el sistema de Derecho internacional privado español”, Revista General de Derecho, nº 547, 
1990, pp. 2089-2119; E. caStellanoS Ruiz, “El trust en el Derecho sucesorio español”, Revista Crítica de Derecho Inmobiliario, 
nº 704, 2007, pp. 2429-2479; M. checa MaRtínez, El “trust” angloamericano en el derecho español, Madrid, McGraw Hill, 1998; 
C. González BelfiuS, El trust: la institución angloamericana y el derecho internacional privado español, Barcelona, Bosh, 1997; 
B. UbeRtazzi, “El trust en el derecho internacional privado italiano y español”, Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional Privado, 
Vol. V, 2005, pp. 199-219; and M. ViRgóS SoRiano, El trust y el Derecho español, Navarra, Thomson Civitas, 2006. 
4  Vid., A. DyeR and H. Van Loon, Report on trusts and analogous institutions, paras. 147-78, 77-92 (available at http://
www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.details&pid=5791&dtid=1). For a comparative study between the trust and the 
fiducia, Vid., J. de AReSPacochaga, El trust, la fiducia y figuras afines, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2000; F. BaRRièRe, La reception 
du trust au travers de la fiducie, Paris, LexisNexis, 2004; S. CáMaRa LaPuente, “El trust y la fiducia : posibilidades para una 
armonización europea”, Derecho Privado Europeo, 2003, pp. 1099-1172; E. CaShin Ritaine, “Panorama compare du droit 
materiel du trust (ou une esquisse impressionniste des concepts de trust et de fiducie)”, in Le trust en droit international privé, 
Perspectives suisses et étrangères. (Actes de la 17ème Journée de droit international privé du 18 mars 2005 à Lausanne (Institut 
suisse de droit comparé, Schulthess, 2005) pp. 17-28; and D. A. R. BeckneR, A. Devaux and M. RyznaR, “The trust as more than 
a common law creature”, Ohio Northern University Law Review, nº 20, 2014, pp. 19-24.  
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2. Nevertheless, in the sphere of the European Union many authors recognise the modern uti-
lity of the trust5 and some civil law countries – Italy, the Netherlands, Malta and Luxembourg – have 
adopted an approach which involves ratifying the Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on 
their Recognition or just have signed the Convention but not yet ratified it -such as Cyprus and France-;6 
while others have introduced trusts or functionally similar devices into their legal systems –ie. Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Liechtenstein or Romania-. Thus, as has already been said, the Hague Convention 
represents “a vital commencement between legal cultures in an agreement on trust law”.7 In this way, 
the introduction of the trust into the conflict of law rules of civil law states could be a first step forward 
for the introduction of the trust into their domestic systems.8
In addition, there are other initiatives in Europe aimed at facilitating the understanding of the 
figure of the trust, and to encourage and enable its incorporation and development into the civil law 
system countries, for example, the Principles of European Trust Law9 or the project of Common Core 
of European Private Law,10 that try to demonstrate a relationship between the different laws relating 
to the concept of the trust. More recently, reference should be made to the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR)11, a project, promoted by the European Commission12 which contain Principles, De-
finitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, it is to say, model rules on several areas of private 
law including provisions relating to trusts. Therefore, it intends to provide Europe with a uniform trust 
law and may contribute to resolve the problems that divergent national trust law within the member 
states creates on cross border trusts. The DCFR defines the trust as follows: “A trust is a legal rela-
tionship in which a trustee is obliged to administer or dispose of one or more assets (the trust fund) in 
accordance with the terms governing the relationship (trust terms) to benefit a beneficiary or advance 
public benefit purposes”13.
5  Vid., among others, S. CáMaRa LaPuente, “Trusts y patrimonios fiduciarios como vías de protección de la persona, la 
familia y la sucesión”, in Autonomía de la voluntad en el derecho privado, Estudios en conmemoración del 150 aniversario 
de la Ley del Notariado, l. PRatS albentoSa (Coord.) (Derecho de la persona, familia y sucesiones), Madrid, Wolters Kluwer 
España, Vol. 1, 2012, pp. 791-792; Ibid. “Trusts y patrimonios fiduciarios: acerca de sus posibles aplicaciones en el derecho 
de la persona, familia y sucesiones y su eventual regulación”, Diario La Ley, nº 7685, 2011, p. 4; M. GRaziadei, U. Mattei and 
L. SMith, Commercial trusts in European Private Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005; H. HanSMann and U. 
Mattei, “The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis”, New York University Law Review, nº 
73, 1998, pp. 434; D. J. Hayton, S. C. J. J. KoRtMann, and H. L. E. VeRhagen (eds.), Principles of European Trust Law, The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999; J. H. Langbein, “The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts”, Yale Law Journal, 
nº 95, 105, pp 625, and 640–643; M. LuPoi, Trust: A Comparative Study, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000; U. 
Mattei, “Basic Issues of Private Law Codification in Europe: Trust”, Global Jurist Frontiers: Vol. 1: No. 1, 2001, Article 
5; and G. G. TRiantiS, “Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: the Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in 
Commercial and Charitable Enterprises”, Harvard Law Review, nº 117, 2004, p. 1102. 
6  This Convention was concluded on 1 July 1985 and entered into force on 1 January 1992. By now it has been ratified by the 
following States: Australia, Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom 
(available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=59). (henceforth, the Hague Trusts Convention).
7  D. W. M. WateRS, “The Hague trusts Convention twenty years on”, in M. GRaziadei, U. Mattei and L. SMith (eds), 
Commercial Trusts in European Private Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 97.
8  Vid., J. HaRRiS, The Hague Trusts Convention, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002, p. 336.
9  These principles were the result of the project organised in 1996 at the University of Nijmegen, the Netherlands, and 
led by Professor David Hayton. Vid., D. J. Hayton, S. C. J. J. KoRtMann, and H. L. E. VeRhagen (eds), Principles of European 
Trust Law, op. cit. 
10  This comparative law study was launched in 1995 by U. Mattei and M. BuSSani. Vid., M. GRaziadei, U. Mattei and L. 
SMith, Commercial trusts in European Private Law, op. cit. 
11  Vid., “Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)”, 
Outline Edition. Prepared by the Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis 
Group). Based in part on a revised version of the Principles of European Contract Law. Edited by C. Von Bar, E. Clive and 
H. Schulte-Nölke and h. beale, J. heRRe, J. huet, M. StoRMe (available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/contract/files/european-
private-law_en.pdf ).
12  Vid., European Commission, Communications to the European Parliament and the Council – A more coherent European 
Contract Law: an action Plan, COM (2003) 68 final, OJ 2003 C 63/1; and European Commission, Communications to the 
European Parliament and the Council – European Contract Law and the revision of the Acquis: The way forward, COM (2004) 
651 final
13 Vid., X. – 1:201: Definition of a trust, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR).
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3. Among the different types, the testamentary trusts are express private trusts created intentio-
nally by the absolute owner of property (settlor)14. In such a cases, the testamentary trusts have to meet 
three certainties – intention, subject matter and object – as the settlor (the testator) must demonstrate 
in the will a clear intention to create a trust,15 and the properties’ legal title must be transferred to the 
trustees before it is effective.16
4. The reasons to include a trust in the will can be varied, for example, to provide protection for 
young children or a disabled person, to save tax, or simply to protect the testator’s assets after he or she 
dies. Certainly, the trust is created by the testator in his or her will to provide the benefits of property af-
ter the death of that person. Thus, often a family property is held on a trust established by the will of the 
testator because the testator does not want to leave his or her property directly to one or several persons. 
In addition, when the trust is created by will it is irrevocable since the testator has died and questions 
regarding the validity of a trust could arise. This issue must be resolved applying not only the law of 
trusts but also the law of successions, because of the interrelation of both laws17.
 
5. The creation of trusts by will can occur in two cases: a) where the will specifies that all or part 
of the property of the deceased person has to be held on trust; or b) where the recipient of the property is 
under the age of 18 and the legal title has to be held for him or her until the mentioned age. Accordingly, 
where the trust is created by the will, the trustees will be appointed by the will and, once the executors 
have finished the administration, they will transfer the property of the deceased person to the trustees, 
although sometimes it does not happen, as when the executor and the trustee are the same person.18 Ne-
vertheless, it is arguable that it is not always appropriate that the same person plays the role of executor 
and trustee at the same time in view of the existing differences between the executor’s duties –which 
can be completed within a few years– and the trustee’s tasks, as the management of the trust can last up 
to 125 years. In addition, sometimes the powers given to the executors and the trustees may come into 
conflict.19 Thus, once the settlor has died, he or she is no longer the owner of the assets in the trust fund, 
but the trustees who will own the legal title to the assets and, consequently, the possibility of managing 
them after the death of the settlor. 
II. Differences between Common and Civil law approaches 
6. As previously stated, the trust is a common law legal concept that does not exist in the ma-
jority of civil law jurisdictions, since the civil law legal tradition does not recognise the divisibility of 
property as the trust does. On the other hand, there are some legal concepts, such as forced heirship 
rights, recognised in the majority of national legislations in civil law countries which make the imple-
mentation and recognition of the trust institution under civil law jurisdictions difficult. Although, under 
English law -Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 197520- there are mandatory family 
protection rules, it can be said that there is a wide discrepancy between the common and civil law ap-
proaches considering that the English mandatory protection rules are discretionary while the civil law 
rules are fixed.21
14  Re Kayford [1975] 1 WLR 279; Paul v Constance [1977] 1 WLR 527.
15  Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148; Knight v Boughton (1840) 11 Cl & Fin 513.
16  Milroy v Lord (1862) 4 De GF&&J 264.
17  R. Lafuente Sánchez, “Testamentary trusts in English Law: An introductory approach”, Cuadernos de Derecho 
Transnacional, Vol. 7, nº 1, 2015, pp. 100-102.
18  S. WilSon, Todd & Wilson’s Textbook on Trusts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 28-30. 
19  G. Steel, Trust practitioner’s handbook, 3rd edn, London, The Law Society, 2012, pp. 45-46.
20  Vid., Chapter 63 of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 (available at http://www.legislation.
gov.uk/ukpga/1975/63).
21  D. Hayton, “European Commission’s Green Paper Consulting on Succession with an International Dimension, Appendix 
B”, 5 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/successions/contributions/contribution_ls_appb_en.pdf 
Raúl lafuente Sánchez Cross border testamentary trusts and the conflict of laws
Cuadernos de Derecho Transnacional (Marzo 2016), Vol. 8, Nº 1, pp. 184-207
ISSN 1989-4570 - www.uc3m.es/cdt
188
Therefore, the approach to succession is more flexible under common law systems than under 
civil law systems and the concept of the trust is crucial to explain this flexibility. The following example 
can be very instructive: in common law systems the trust can be used to transfer majority shareholdings 
in companies to trustees to manage for the benefit of the heirs (descendants and spouse). Meanwhile, in 
civil law systems the compulsory application of the forced heirship rights would forcefully be passed 
small minority shareholdings to each of one’s heirs. Which of the two systems is better for protecting the 
interests of the heirs? Arguably, the common law system allows a greater amount of flexibility.
1. The trust and the civil law concept of ownership
7. Some civil law authors have considered the trust as equivalent to other institutions like the 
fidei commissum or the usufruct. Nevertheless, it could be a mistake inasmuch as the trust is unique for 
the following reasons: 
First of all, in the trust there is a clear separation between the legal ownership (the legal title) 
vested in the trustee and the beneficial ownership of the trust vested in the beneficiaries. Secondly, the 
trust property constitute a separate fund22. It means that the assets held by the testamentary trusts belong 
to the trust not to the beneficiary personally. Consequently, the creditors will be unable to access the as-
sets in the trust, for example, where the trustee become bankrupt. Thirdly, the proprietary interests of the 
beneficiaries in the trust property lead to the control of the property by the trustees, because the interests 
of the beneficiaries prevail not only over the interests of the trustee but also over any claiming under the 
trustee. Finally, the trust property is considered as a fund and part of the assets of the trust could be sold 
and reinvested.23 
8. On the contrary, civil law systems recognise that the ownership is an absolute right by ex-
tension of individual freedom. It means that the ownership is unique, indivisible and inalienable, and 
that only one person has the ownership or dominum over property –right to use, to enjoy and to dispose, 
meanwhile the others have personal claims against the owner of the property24. Therefore, there is no 
division between the legal and the beneficial ownership. 
2. Forced heirship rights
9. Continuing with the differences between the common and civil law approaches, now the fo-
llowing question arises: may an individual be free to dispose of his property as he or she pleases? The 
answer will be different depending on the legal system we refer to. Thus, civil law systems recognise the 
forced heirship rights, that is to say, the rights conferred by the law on some relatives of the deceased 
if they accept the succession. These rights cover a part of the estate of the deceased, are governed by 
the testator’s personal law and cannot be disposed by the will. It means that there is a reserve portion 
of which certain heirs cannot be deprived and a free portion which can be disposed of by the testator 
according to his or her will.25 Consequently, one thing is clear: that the approach adopted by the different 
22  Hague Trusts Convention, art 11. 
23  J. MowbRay, L. TuckeR, N. Le Poidevin, E. SiMPSon and J. BRightwell, Lewin on Trusts, 18th ed., London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2008, pp. 14-15, para 1–20.
24  D. A. R. BeckneR, A. Devaux and M. RyznaR, “The trust as more than …”, loc. cit., p. 12; and F. W. Maitland, Equity, 
a course of lectures, 2nd edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1936, p. 24. Thus, for instance, the Spanish Civil Code, 
in its article 348, stipulates that the right of property includes the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations 
than those established by law, and that the owner has an action against the holder and possessor of the thing to claim it. Vid., 
Real Decreto de 24 de julio de 1889 (available at https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1889-4763). In the same 
way, article 544 of the French Civil Code defines ownership as “the right to enjoy and dispose of things on the most absolute 
manner, providing they are not used in a way prohibited by statutes or Regulations” (available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.
fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070721)
25  For example, the Spanish Civil Code in article 806 refers to the reserved portion, “legitima”, as the portion of the 
deceased’s estates which the testator cannot dispose of under his or her freedom of testation, since it is guaranteed by law 
to certain heirs, so-called forced heirs. Vid., Real Decreto de 24 de julio de 1889 (available at https://www.boe.es/buscar/
act.php?id=BOE-A-1889-4763). The French Civil Code also refers to forced heirship in article 912 and considers that it is a 
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jurisdictions to answering this question will have consequences in other jurisdictions and, as far as the 
trust is concerned, forced heirship rights could raise problems because of the clawback feature.
10. Generally speaking, the different approach between the two systems resides in the distinct 
concept of protection of the family that each system recognises. Hence, while the English system consi-
ders that the parents have no legal obligation to their grown-up children, except if they have physical or 
mental problems, the civil law system believes that parents must protect their children by giving them 
a part of their property.26 Therefore, the trust – which reflects the importance of the freedom of a person 
to alienate his or her property at the time of death – and the forced heirship rights – which try to protect 
the interests of family members – are not compatible to the extent that when the testator has disposed 
of a portion greater than that available, according to the free portion, gifts or legacies are subject to the 
“clawback” rule, that is to say, the forced heirship is allowed to clawback lifetime gifts or legacies in 
order to protect their rights. Otherwise, the forced heirs would not receive a proper share of the estate of 
the testator, which is considered unfair under civil law systems.
11. It is arguable whether or not forced heirship rights may be considered by the law as public 
policy. Some civil law jurisdictions have considered that they are and could be imposed as a limit to the 
application to foreign law and, consequently, to the trust.27 But some authors have argued that the forced 
heirship rights as public policy should only apply under exceptional circumstances in order to achieve 
the unity of law.28 Otherwise, the direct consequence would be that forced heirship rights may be ignored 
in favour of the trust. Of course, this system could be contrary to the common law system of inheritance. 
As a result, a testamentary trust created by an English testator could be affected by the forced heirship 
rights of a civil law country, for example the French, where there are no restrictions as far as the years 
are concerned in order to claim for compensation where property was given away before the death of the 
testator. This rule would be considered uncertain and unfair considering that under common law systems 
property given away by the testator in his or her lifetime will not be considered as part of his or her estate 
at death. Accordingly, where somebody claims forced heirship rights under a foreign lex successionis it 
would operate only for the estate of the testator at the moment of death.
12. However, does it mean that the English system is unfair to heirs compared to the civil law 
system? Obviously no, since the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 allows 
people to challenge the gifts made in bad faith within six years of the death with the intention of defea-
ting an application for financial provision under this Act. In such a cases, “the court may order the donee 
(whether or not at the date of the order he holds any interest in the property disposed of to him or for his 
benefit by the deceased) to provide, for the purpose of the making of that financial provision, such sum 
of money or other property as may be specified in the order”.29 
13. In conclusion, generally speaking forced heirship rules are contrary to the principle of au-
tonomy of the testator to dispose of his or her property when creating a testamentary trust. In addition, 
where the public policy rules apply, the testamentary trusts will have to reduce the estates to the ne-
reserved portion of the deceased’s estates guaranteed free of charges by the law to certain vesting heirs if they are called to the 
succession and they accept (available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070721).
26  D. Hayton, “European Commission’s Green Paper …”, doc. cit., p. 5. 
27  Vid., for example, the Spanish Supreme Court Decision on 23 October 1992 (STS 7948/1992). In the Spanish doctrine, 
J. C. FeRnández RozaS and S. Sánchez LoRenzo, Derecho internacional privado, 8th ed., Pamplona, Civitas Thomson Reuters, 
2015, p. 151, consider the forced heirship rights as a matter of domestic public policy instead of international public policy and, 
therefore, could not be imposed a limit to a trust. 
28  D. A. R. BeckneR, A. Devaux and M. RyznaR, “The trust as more than …”, loc. cit., p. 19, in the context of the European 
Union Succession Regulation.
29  Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, doc. cit., section 10, Dispositions intended to defeat 
applications for financial provision. Vid., the Report of The Law Society, “Joint Response of the Law Society of England & 
Wales and the Society of Trust & Estate Practitioners to the European Commission’s Green Paper on Succession and Wills”, 2-3 
(available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/successions/contributions/contribution_ls_en.pdf ).
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cessary extent in order to guarantee the forced heirship rights. Hence, it cannot be said that the trust is 
incompatible with forced heirship rights but it could be argued that there is a boundary to the trust under 
foreign jurisdictions which apply the forced heirship rights since this rule limits the right of the settlor 
and, consequently, the trustee.30
III. Jurisdiction of the English Court over cross-border testamentary trusts
1. Jurisdiction under European Union legislation 
A) Brussels I Regulation31
14. It may seem that the Recast Regulation only applies to inter vivos trusts and not to trusts 
arising on death under a will due to the exclusion of “wills and successions” from its scope.32 However, 
for the purposes of the Regulation one must distinguish between the will that creates the trust which 
is out of the scope of the Regulation and the trust of property which is within the scope of the Regula-
tion.33 Consequently, the Regulation does not apply to disputes concerning the validity or interpretation 
of the terms of a will which sets up the testamentary trusts, nor to the disputes concerning the creation, 
interpretation and administration of trusts arising under the law of successions. Moreover, internal 
relationships of a trust –between settlor, trustees and beneficiaries– are not covered by the provisions 
on jurisdiction under the Recast Regulation in the case of testamentary trusts, since they are not of a 
contractual nature.
15. On the contrary, the external relationships with third parties –for instance, the disputes ari-
sing between the trustee and persons other than beneficiaries by virtue of contract, tort, delict or quasi-
delict– are of a contractual nature and will fall within the scope of the Recast Regulation which contains 
specific rules which also apply to trusts created in a will.34
a) Domicile of the defendant as general jurisdictional rule
16. As stated in the Recast Regulation, the primary jurisdiction rule is the “domicile of the 
defendant”. This means that “persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be 
sued in the courts of that Member State”.35 Therefore, the English court will have jurisdiction where the 
defendant trustee is domiciled in England and Wales. As regards the concept of “domicile”, it will be 
determined according to the internal law of the Member State “whose courts are seised of a matter”.36 In 
this sense, English law determines that an individual is considered as domiciled in the United Kingdom 
if has reside therein for the last three months or more37. When the defendant is a company or other legal 
30  D. A. R. BeckneR, A. Devaux and M. RyznaR, “The trust as more than …”, loc. cit., pp. 9-10.
31  Council Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters (recast) [2012] OJ L 351 
(henceforth, the Recast Regulation). 
32  Recast Regulation, art. 1.2 f).
33  D. Hayton, “The need for harmonisation of Private international law rules on succession, Appendix C, Topicality in view 
of the European Commission Green Paper”, 3 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/successions/
contributions/contribution_ls_appc_en.pdf
34  Vid., the official Explanatory Report of Professor Dr P. SCHLOSSER, “Report on the Convention on the Association 
of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the 
Court of Justice” (OJEC C 59, 5/03/79), para 52 and 109 et seq.
35  Recast Regulation, art. 4.
36  Ibid art. 62.1.
37  Vid., The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982, s.41 (available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1982/27/
contents) and the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Order 2001, Sched.1, para 9 (available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
uksi/2001/3929/contents/made)
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person or association of natural or legal persons they will be considered domiciled at the place where 
they have their: (a) statutory seat, or b) central administration, or (c) principal place of business.38
17. Where there are several defendants domiciled in more than one jurisdiction, the English court 
will have jurisdiction, as long as one of the defendants is domiciled in England, “provided the claims are 
so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irrecon-
cilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings”.39 On the other hand, where at least one defendant 
is domiciled in a non-Member State, the English court could have jurisdiction according to the rules on 
service and with the permission of the court, provided that there is no prorogation of jurisdiction. Where 
the English court is unable to exercise jurisdiction over a non-European defendant, they could argue for 
the application of the doctrine of forum non-conveniens in favour of a non-European forum.40
18. However, as mentioned by Prof. Schlosser in his Report on the Brussels Convention, in trust 
matters, it would not be appropriate to base jurisdiction on the domicile of the defendant trustee because 
it could happen that the domicile of the defendant has no links to the place where the trust property is 
located and administered.41 
b) Jurisdiction of the Court in which the trust is domiciled
19. In order to provide a better solution, the Recast Regulation, following the exception to the 
general rule foreseen in the Recast Regulation, sets up an special jurisdiction based on the concept of the 
domicile of the trust, considering that although trusts have no legal personality they have a geographical 
centre of operation. In this way: “A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, 
be sued: (6) as settlor, trustee or beneficiary of a trust created by the operation of a statute, or by a writ-
ten instrument, or created orally and evidenced in writing, in the courts of the Member State in which 
the trust is domiciled”.42 To determine whether a trust is domiciled in the Member State whose courts 
are seised of a matter, the court shall apply its rules of private international law.43 
20. Certainly, the proposed solution, in order to fix the domicile of the trust, will be a difficult 
matter for the civil law jurisdictions where the trust institution is neither known nor regulated and where 
no rules of private international law determine the domicile of a trust. In such a case, the solution to sol-
ve this conflict could be to apply the domestic law (lex fori) which determines the domicile of the natural 
or legal entities, or to consider that the domicile of the trust is located in the jurisdiction with which the 
trust is most closely connected.44
On the contrary, the concept of domicile is well-developed under English law where a trust is 
considered to be domiciled in the United Kingdom or a part thereof “if, and only if, the system of law 
of that part is the system of law with which the trust has its closest and most real connection”.45 It is 
38  Recast Regulation, art. 63.1; the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982, s.42 (available at http://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/1982/27/contents), and the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Order 2001, Sched.1, para 12 (available at http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2001/3929/contents/made)
39  Recast Regulation, art. 8.1.
40  J. MowbRay et al., Lewin on Trusts, op. cit., pp. 381-382, paras 11-2405.
41  Vid., the official Explanatory Report of Professor Dr P. SchloSSeR, doc. cit., para 113.
42  Recast Regulation, art. 7.6.
43  Ibid art. 63.3.
44  This is the solution proposed by the Spanish doctrine in order to determine the domicile of the trust. Vid.,, for example, M. 
DeSanteS Real, La competencia judicial en la Comunidad Europea, Barcelona, Bosh, 1986, p. 326; and J. C. FeRnández RozaS 
and S. Sánchez LoRenzo, Derecho internacional privado, op. cit., pp. 637-638; other authorities consider that in such a case, the 
domicile of the trust will be the domicile of the trustee, Vid., M. ViRgóS SoRiano, El Trust y el Derecho …, op. cit., p. 89. 
45  Vid., The Civil Jurisdiction and Judgment Act 1982, s.45 (3) (available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1982/27/
contents) and the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Order 2001, Schedule. 1, para 12 (available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/
uklegislation/uksi/2001/3929/contents. In Gomez v Gomez-Monche Vives, [2008] EWCA Civ 1065, [2009] Ch 245 at [87] and 
[90] the Court of Appeal held that the system of law with which the trust had its closest and most real connection would apply 
to determinate its domicile under Article 5(6) of the Recast Regulation. 
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noteworthy that this will normally be the system of law that provides the law governing the validity of 
the trust.46 
c) Exclusive jurisdiction
21. In proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies 
of immovable property, the Recast Regulation establishes exclusive jurisdiction to “the courts of the 
Member State in which the property is situated”47 even though neither party is domiciled in a Member 
State. In such a case, the court of a Member State will have exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the 
defendant’s domicile.48 Nevertheless, the European Court of Justice has interpreted this provision in a 
restrictive way considering that “an action for a declaration that a person holds immovable property as 
trustee and for an order requiring that person to execute such documents as should be required to vest 
the legal ownership in the plaintiff does not constitute an action in rem within the meaning of Article 16 
(1) of the Convention“,and that “the conferring of exclusive jurisdiction in the matter of rights in rem 
in immovable property on the courts of the State in which the property is situated is justified because 
actions concerning rights in rem in immovable property often involve disputes frequently necessitating 
checks, inquiries and expert assessments which must be carried out on the spot”.49
22. Therefore, where there is an in personam claim exclusive jurisdiction does not apply. In such 
a case, the trustee may be sued either in the courts of the Member State where he is domiciled or where 
the trust is domiciled.
d) Prorogation of jurisdiction
23. Moreover, the Recast Regulation allows a trust instrument to include a provision conferring 
jurisdiction in favour of the court of a Member State “in any proceedings brought against a settlor, 
trustee or beneficiary, if relations between these persons or their rights or obligations under the trust 
are involved”,50 provided that such agreements are not contrary to Articles 15, 19 or 23, referring to the 
agreement of jurisdiction, nor exclude the competence of the courts which have exclusive jurisdiction 
by virtue of Article 24.51 In any case, this provision refers exclusively to the internal relations among the 
settlor, trustees and beneficiaries and their rights or obligations under the trust. Therefore, being disputes 
that fall under the scope of creation, interpretation and administration of trusts the choice of jurisdiction 
clause foreseen under the Recast Regulation will not apply to testamentary trusts.
B) European Union Successions Regulation52 
24. This Regulation applies from 17 August 201553 and provides a uniform system for determi-
ning the jurisdiction, the applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in matters 
46  D. Hayton, “Trusts in Private International Law”, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (Vol 
366), Brill, Nijhoff, Leiden, Boston, 2014, p. 46. Vid., Chellaram v. Chellaram (Nº 2) [2002] 3 All ER 17 at [162]; and Gomez 
v. Gomez-Monche Vives [2008] EWCA Civ. 1065 [2009] Ch 245, at [72].
47  Recast Regulation, art. 24.1.
48  J. HaRRiS, “Jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments in transnational trusts litigation”, in D. Hayton (ed) 
The international trust, 3rd ed., Bristol, Jordans, 2011, pp. 13-14.
49  Vid., case C-294/92, Webb v Webb [1994] ECR 1-1717; and Case 73/77 Sanders v Van der Putte [1977] ECR 2383, at 
para 13).
50  Recast Regulation, art. 25.3.
51  Ibid art. 25.4.
52  Regulation (EU) Nº 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, applicable 
law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession 
and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession [2012] OJ L 201 (henceforth, the European Union Successions 
Regulation). 
53  The Regulation entered into force on 16 August 2012 (Article 84) and applies to the succession of persons who die on 
or after 17 August 2015 (Article 83).
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of succession at the European Union level, as well as for the creation of a European Certificate of Suc-
cession. Accordingly, it provides for general procedural rules similar to those of other European Union 
instruments in the sphere of judicial cooperation in civil matters and introduce harmonised conflict of 
law rules in this subject. This harmonisation only affects to the conflict of law rules of the European 
Union Member States but does not affect the substantive inheritance national laws54. 
25. Nevertheless, trusts are partially excluded from the scope of the European Union Regu-
lation, particularly all the questions relating to the creation, administration and dissolution of trusts.55 
Besides, as far as jurisdiction and testamentary trusts are concerned, the Regulation does not include 
rules of jurisdiction.
2. Appropriate forum under the common law rules 
26. Where the European Union legislation does not apply, common law rules will be applied 
in order to determine the jurisdiction of the English court. As a general rule, the English court can have 
jurisdiction on the basis of the person of defendant (in personam) or the subject matter concerned.
A) General rule: person of defendant and subject matter
27. As far as the defendant is concerned, the common law rule is that where the defendant, for 
example the trustee, is an individual within the jurisdiction of the English court, he or she may be ser-
ved there. Likewise, where the defendant is a corporation with a presence in England it may be served 
within the jurisdiction of the English court. Conversely, where the defendant is in another territory, he 
or she can be served in that territory, but in order to do that, the claimant has to obtain permission from 
the English court.56 In addition, the English court may have jurisdiction in personam over the defendant 
under the submission to the jurisdiction of the English court.57
 
28. So far as the subject matter is concerned, the English court will have jurisdiction to enforce 
the trust to the extent that the trustee can be brought before it, regardless of the governing law of the trust 
– English or foreign – and the place where the trust property is located – either in England or abroad.58
B) Forum conveniens 
29. It will apply in cases where the claimant can prove that serving the proceeding under the 
English court will be the most appropriate method for the resolution of the dispute and the best solution 
for the interests of all parties involved in the process compared with the alternative of other foreign 
courts.59 In order to prove that, the nature of the dispute, the legal and practical issues involved in the 
dispute, or the availability of the witness shall be taken into account.60 On the other hand, the applicable 
law to the trust will not be decisive in order to determine the forum conveniens of the English court. 
54  The Regulation applies in all European Union States except the UK, Republic of Ireland and Denmark. (Recitals 82 
and 83).
55  Ibid art 1 2 (j). 
56  Civil Procedure Rules, Part 6, Services of documents, Rule 6.36, specifies: In any proceedings to which rule 6.32 or 
6.33 does not apply, the claimant may serve a claim form out of the jurisdiction with the permission of the court if any of the 
grounds set out in paragraph 3.1 of Practice Direction 6B apply (available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/
civil/rules/part06#6.36).
57  J. MowbRay et al., Lewin on Trusts, op. cit., p. 367, para 11-05 at 11-06.
58 Ewing v Orr Ewing (1883) 9 App. Cas. 34, HL; Re Ker’s Settlement Trusts [1963] Ch 553; Chellaram v Chellaram [1985] 
Ch. 409; and Webb v Webb [1991] 1 W.L.R. 1410.
59  Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] A.C. 460, HL; Vid., also Dicey, MoRRiS and CollinS on The 
Conflict of Laws, 15th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, vol. 1, pp. 429-430, para. 11-142 at 11.143; and A. BRiggS and 
P. ReeS, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, 5th ed., London, Informa Law, 2009, pp. 628-630, para 5.65.
60  Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd, 449.
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Nevertheless, it is a positive point if the trust is governed by English law, which the court should take 
into account in determining its jurisdiction.61 
C) Forum non-conveniens 
30. Conversely to the case of forum conveniens, it could happen that the English court considers 
that it is not the most appropriate forum for determining the claiming but a foreign court. In these cases, 
the defendant should be submitted to the same considerations referred to above and will have to prove that 
a foreign forum is much more appropriate than English court.62 Where it happens, the English court can 
decline jurisdiction in favour of a foreign court of which the jurisdiction is considered more appropriate.63 
IV. The governing law of cross-border testamentary trusts
1. European Union legislation
31. As a general principle, the European Union conflict of laws rules dealing with the applicable 
law excludes the trusts from the scope of application of such instruments. Thus, for example, the Rome 
I Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations,64 the Rome II Regulation on the law appli-
cable to non-contractual obligations,65 or the Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area 
of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation.66
A) Rome I Regulation
32. The Rome I Regulation does not apply to the constitution of trusts and the relationship bet-
ween settlors, trustees and beneficiaries.67 As the trust is excluded from the scope of the Regulation, the-
re is no definition of this concept and it has to be understood that the referred exclusion covers all types 
of trusts, even those arising under a contractual agreement.68 On the other hand, the Rome I Regulation 
shall not prejudice the application of international conventions to which one Member State is party at 
the time when this Regulation is adopted and which lay down conflict of law rules relating to contractual 
obligations such as, for example, the Hague Trusts Convention.69
B) Rome II Regulation
33. Likewise, the Rome II Regulation excludes from its scope non-contractual obligations 
arising out of the relations among the settlors, trustees and beneficiaries of a trust created voluntarily.70 
Without a doubt, the words of this provision are more accurate than the equivalent in the Rome I Regu-
61  EMM Capricorn Trustees Ltd v Compas Trustees Ltd (2001-02) 4 I.T.E.L.R. 34 at 26; and Koonmen v Bender (2003-04) 
6 I.T.E.L.R. 568 at 38.
62  Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd, cit., at 464-465 and 474-478; Vid., also Dicey, MoRRiS and CollinS on the 
Conflict of Laws, op. cit., p. 539, para. 12-010; and A. BRiggS and P. ReeS, Civil Jurisdiction …, op. cit., p. 355, para 2.255.
63  To the exception of United Kingdom and Ireland, the theory of forum non-conveniens is rejected by the rest of European 
Union countries. Vid.,, DNotI, Institute Notarial Allemand, “Les Successions Internationales dans l’UE. Perspectives pour une 
Harmonisation” (2004) Bruxelles, 10-11.05.2004, 40, 44.
64  Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I), [2008] OJ L 177.
65  Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to 
non-contractual obligations (Rome II), [2007] OJ L 199.
66  Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010, of 20 December 2010, implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
law applicable to divorce and legal separation, [2010] OJ L 343, art Article 1 (2) h. 
67  Rome I Regulation, art 1 (2) (h).
68  Vid., Dicey, MoRRiS and CollinS on Conflict of Laws, op. cit., Rule 168, para 29-009. 
69  Rome I Regulation, art 25 (1).
70  Rome II Regulation, art 1 (2) (e).
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lation because it refers specifically to the trusts created voluntarily. Certainly, it should be interpreted 
in the same fashion as in the Hague Convention.71 Sensu contrario, those trusts not created voluntarily, 
which do not include testamentary trusts, may be affected by Rome II. Again, this Regulation shall not 
prejudice the application of international conventions to which one Member State is party at the time 
when this Regulation is adopted and which lay down conflict of law rules relating to non-contractual 
obligations,72 for instance, the Hague Trusts Convention.
34. As The Hague Trusts Convention applies only to trusts created voluntarily and evidenced in 
writting, it means that it prevails on the Rome II Regulation. Nevertheless, the Hague Trusts Convention 
stipulates that “any Contracting State may, at any time, declare that the provisions of the Convention 
will be extended to trusts declared by judicial decisions”.73 The United Kingdom has gone beyond to the 
Convention in view of the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 that extends the application of the provisions 
of the Hague Trusts Convention “to any other trusts of property arising under the law of any part of 
the United Kingdom or by virtue of a judicial decision whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere”.74 
Consequently, the Hague Trusts Convention also prevails over the Rome II Regulation in relation to the 
trusts created by judicial decision but not in those cases related to any other trust of property arising 
under the law of any part of the United Kingdom if Rome I or Rome II were applicable.75 In short, the 
Rome II Regulation will apply to non-voluntary trusts as well as all those trusts of property arising un-
der the law of any part of the United Kingdom; meanwhile the Hague Trusts Convention will apply to 
voluntary trusts, for example, testamentary trusts and trusts created by judicial decisions. 
C) European Union Successions Regulation
a) Exclusion of the trusts from the scope of the Regulation
35. As pointed out above, trusts are partially excluded from the scope of the Regulation, particu-
larly the creation, administration and dissolution of trusts. Therefore, it is important to distinguish bet-
ween the validity of the will that creates the trust – the will is under the scope of the Regulation – and the 
validity of the trust – creation, administration and dissolution – which is excluded from the Regulation. 
Hence, when the testator creates a testamentary trust the court will apply the lex successionis according 
to the Regulation in order to determinate the validity of the will, it is to say, to ascertain whether a trust 
can arise respect of property which is going to pass under a testator’s will. Where the will is valid, then 
the trust created by the will is also valid regardless of the law applicable to the succession and provided 
that it observes the provisions of the domestic law governing the trust.76
36. However, the Regulation sets out some exceptions. Thus, “where a trust is created under 
a will or under statute in connection with intestate succession, the law applicable to the succession 
under this Regulation should apply with respect to the devolution of the assets and the determination 
of the beneficiaries”.77 It means that the applicable law to the succession specified by Regulation will 
govern the “obligation to restore or account for gifts, advancements or legacies when determining 
71  Hague Trusts Convention, art. 3.
72  Rome II Regulation, art 28.1.
73  Hague Trusts Convention, art 20. 
74  Recognition of Trusts Act 1987, section 1 (2) (available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1987/14), which enacts 
as English law the choice of law rules of the Hague Trusts Convention. This Act came into force on 1 August 1987. 
75  Vid., Dicey, MoRRiS and CollinS on Conflict of Laws, op. cit., Rule 168, para 29-011, and D. Hayton, “Trusts in Private 
International …”, loc. cit., pp. 69-70.
76  J. CaRRaScoSa González, El Reglamento sucesorio europeo 650/2012 de 4 de julio 2012. Análisis crítico, Granada, 
Comares, 2014, pp. 250-251; and a. bonoMi, “Choice of law aspects of the future EC Regulation in matters of succession. A first 
glance at the Commission’s proposal” in K. Boele-woelko, T. EinhoRn, D. GiRSbeRgeR and S. SyMeonideS (eds), Convergence 
and divergence in Private international law – Liber amicorum Kurt Siehr, The Hague-Zürich, Eleven International Publishing 
and Schulthess, 2010, pp. 157-172.
77  European Union Successions Regulation, Recital 13. 
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the shares of the different beneficiaries”,78 and it may affect the dispositions made by the testator in 
the trust.
Regarding the lex successionis and the devolution of the assets, it can be distinguished between 
the devolution of the assets from the testator (the settlor) to the trustee, or from the trustee to the bene-
ficiaries. In the first case, it is a matter dealing with the creation of the trust. Therefore, the lex succes-
sionis cannot regulate the devolution of the assets from the testator to the trustee since it is excluded 
from the scope of the Regulation. In the same way, the devolution of the assets from the trustee to the 
beneficiaries of the trust is a matter dealing with the administration of the trust and, consequently, shall 
be excluded from the scope of the Regulation.79
 On the other hand, the scope of the law applicable to the succession will also determine the 
beneficiaries in any given succession.80 A broad interpretation of the term “beneficiary” – which has not 
been defined under article 3, definitions, of the Regulation – could cover not only heirs and legatees 
and persons entitled to reserve share but also the trusts beneficiaries. In this sense, the Recital 13 of the 
Regulation should be understood as referring also to the beneficiaries of the trusts created under a will. 
Nevertheless, it is a controversial matter, since, if we consider that the term “beneficiaries” includes the 
beneficiaries of the trust, the lex successionis would regulate a matter dealing with the creation of the 
trust – the parties to a testamentary trust – which is excluded from the scope of the Regulation. Conse-
quently, the term “beneficiary” should not refer to the trusts beneficiaries.81
37. In conclusion, it becomes apparent that there is a contradiction between the limitation pro-
vided for in article 1 of the Regulation, which excludes the creation, administration and dissolution of 
trusts from the scope of the Regulation, and the statement under Recital 13 of the Regulation, when it 
stipulates that the lex successionis under the Regulation shall apply with respect to the devolution of the 
assets and the determination of the beneficiaries. In my opinion, the interpretation to be given to that 
provision will have to be clarified in the future by the European Court of Justice.
b) Reasons for excluding the trusts from the scope of the Regulation
38. Undoubtedly, it could have been a good opportunity to deal with the figure of the trust in a 
European Union Regulation, which harmonises the conflict of laws rules on succession matters. Never-
theless, the Regulation has excluded the trust in order to prevent civil law system countries having to 
recognise a discretionary trust included in a will that gives the testator the discretion to specify a group 
of beneficiaries on the trust property, and which can be contrary to the forced heirship rights foreseen 
in these jurisdictions.
On the other hand, it was unrealistic to think that the Regulation could deal with such a legal 
concept unknown in the jurisdictions of the majority of the European Union countries, taking into ac-
count that, apart from the United Kingdom, only four European Union countries – Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta and the Netherlands – have ratified the Hague Trust Convention, while the rest have avoided 
doing that – only Cyprus and France have signed, although not yet ratified the Convention. 
Finally, considering the existence of the Hague Trusts Convention, it is also arguable whether 
the solution is the adoption of a specific and different conflict of law rules at the European Union 
level.82
78  Ibid art 23.2 (i) and Recital 14. 
79  P. H. Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts, 10th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 100-104; and R. S. Paz 
LaMela, “La exclusión de los “trusts” del futuro Reglamento Bruselas/Roma IV”, Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional 
Privado, Vol. XI, 2011, p. 454.
80  European Union Successions Regulation, art 23.2 (b) and Recital 47.
81  R. S. Paz LaMela, “La exclusión …”, loc. cit., p. 453; and E. CaStellanoS Ruiz, “Sucesión hereditaria, Reglamento 
650/2012 sobre sucesión internacional”, in A. L. Calvo CaRavaca and J. CaRRaScoSa González, Derecho internacional 
privado, Granada, Comares, 2014, p. 610. 
82  G. Baignoni, “L’ambito di applicazione del regolamento sulle successioni”, in P. FRanzina and A. LeandRo (a cura di), 
Il diritto internazionale privato europeo delle successioni “mortis causa”, Milano, Giuffrè, 2013, p. 43. 
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2. The Hague Trusts Convention and the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 
A) Introduction
39. The rules governing the trust are held in the Hague Trusts Convention,83 which were incor-
porated as part of the law of the United Kingdom by the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987. It is noteworthy 
that the Convention determines the law applicable to the trust once it has been created. Pursuant to the 
Convention “the term “trust” refers to the legal relationships created - inter vivos or on death” -, and 
applies only to “trusts created voluntarily and evidenced in writing” – therefore, it applies to testamen-
tary trusts – but does not “to preliminary issues relating to the validity of wills or of other acts by virtue 
of which assets are transferred to the trustee”. The Convention will also not apply to the extent that the 
law, which would be applicable, “does not provide for trusts or the category of trusts involved”.84 On the 
other hand, the Convention does not introduce the trust into the domestic law of the States, but facilitates 
the recognition of the trusts created in accordance with the law specified by the Convention as far as the 
purpose of private international law is concerned.
40. The Recognition of Trusts Act 1987, which enacts as English law the choice of law rules 
of the Hague Trusts Convention, governs the applicable law to trusts in England which applies the 
Convention’s provisions “not only in relation to the trusts described in Articles 2 and 3 of the Conven-
tion but also in relation to any other trusts of property arising under the law of any part of the United 
Kingdom or by virtue of a judicial decision whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere”.85 
Thus, when a case of trust is under English jurisdiction the court will decide first whether the 
Convention is applicable in order to determine the choice of law. Otherwise, the court will apply the 
common law rules of choice of law. Nevertheless, before that, the court will have to analyse a number 
of preliminary issues which are excluded from the Hague Trusts Convention.
B) Preliminary issues excluded from The Hague Trusts Convention
41. Where the trust is created by the testator in the will, preliminary issues relating to the validity 
of wills or of other acts by virtue of which assets are transferred to the trustee will be governed by the 
common law rules since these preliminary issues are excluded from The Hague Trusts Convention86. Ob-
viously, in order to create a trust there should be previous or preliminary acts, although they do not relate 
to the trust. It has been defined by some authors as the “rocket-launcher and the rocket”.87 Thus, “the law 
83  For more information about the conception and evolution and content of the Hague Trusts Convention, Vid., A. E. Von 
OveRbeck, “Explanatory Report on the 1985 Hague Trusts Convention”, 1-10 (available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl30.
pdf). The literature on this subject is immense. Vid., among others, J. HaRRiS, The Hague Trusts Convention, op. cit.,; D. W. M. 
WateRS, “The Hague trusts Convention twenty years on”, loc. cit.,; D. Hayton, “The Hague Convention on the Law applicable 
to Trusts and on their recognition”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Nº 36, April 1987, pp. 260-282; H. Kötz, 
“The Hague Convention on the Law applicable to trusts and their recognition”, in D. Hayton (ed) Modern international 
developments in trust law, London, Kluwer Law International, 1999, chapter 3; M. O’Sullivan, “The Hague Convention on 
Trusts-Further considerations”, Journal of International Trust and Corporate Planning, nº 2, 1993, pp. 65 ss.; D. Hayton, “The 
Hague Convention on Trusts: A little is better than nothing but why so little?” Journal of International Trust and Corporate 
Planning, nº 3, 1994, pp. 23 ss.; C. JauffRet-SPinoSi, “La Convention de la Haye relative à la loi applicable au trust et à sa 
reconnaissance”, Journal du Droit International, nº 114, 1987, pp. 23 ss.; E. GaillaRd, “Les enseignements de la Convention 
de La Haye du 1er juillet 1985 relative à la loi applicable au trust et à sa reconnaissance“ Revue juridique et politique, nº 304, 
1990, pp. 304 ss.; E. GaillaRd and D. T. TRautMan, “La Convention de La Haye du 1er juillet 1985 sur la loi applicable au 
trust et à sa reconnaissance“, Revue Critique de Droit International Privé, 1986, pp. 1 ss. An extensive bibliography on the 
Convention may be consulted on the website of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (available at https://www.
hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/publications1/?dtid=1&cid=59)
84  Hague Trusts Convention, art 2, 3, 4 and 5. D. Hayton states that the Convention provides a broad description of a trust 
in order to render the Convention more acceptable to civilian jurisdiction with trust-like institutions. Vid., “Trusts in Private 
International…”, loc. cit.,at p. 61. 
85  Recognition of Trusts Act 1987, section 1 (2). 
86  Hague Trusts Convention, article 4.
87  Vid., J. HaRRiS, The Hague Trusts …, op. cit., pp. 151-157; D. Hayton, “The Hague Convention …”, loc. cit., pp. 260-
268; and A. E. Von OveRbeck, “Explanatory Report …”, doc. cit., para 53.
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designated by the Convention applies only to the establishment on the trust itself, and not to the validity 
of the act by which the transfer of assets is carried out”.88 In cases of testamentary trusts, the previous 
existence of the will is necessary – it will be the launcher – to launch the rocket – the testamentary trust. 
Therefore, in English law, it is clear that the validity of the will and the validity or administration of a 
trust contained in the will are governed by different laws,89 although, in some cases, the law chosen for 
the trust, or the law which is more closely connected to the trust according to the Convention, could be 
the same law, for example, the lex successionis.
a) The validity of the will
42. According to English common rules, the formal validity of the will shall be governed by 
“the internal law in force in the territory where it was executed, or in the territory where, at the time of 
its execution or of the testator’s death, he was domiciled or had his habitual residence, or in a State of 
which, at either of those times, he was a national”.90
Thus, as stated by the Will Act 1837 a will should comply with the following formalities and 
conditions in order to be valid: 
a)  it has to be in writing; 
b)   it must be signed by the testator, or by some other person in his or her presence and by his 
or her direction; and 
c)   the signature should be made or acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two or more 
witnesses present at the same time.91 
On the other hand, in order to enforce a testamentary trust, a grant of probate or of administra-
tion has to be obtained. It will be the proof of the validity of the will, which will allow the English court 
to give effect to the will.92
b) The law governing the assets transferred to the trustee
43. As far as the law governing the assets transferred to the trustee is concerned, it will depend 
on the nature – movable or immovable – of the assets. So far as the immovable property is concerned, 
the English court will apply the English rules to decide where a particular asset is located93; then, the 
court will determine the nature of the assets according to the law of the place where the asset is located 
–lex situs- and, where the immovable is situated in England and Wales, English law will apply. Con-
versely, where according to the English rules the immovable is located in a foreign territory the English 
court will have to consult the appropriate foreign law – including the choice of law rules – in order to 
determine the applicable law. The governing law to these preliminary issues will rule not only the asset 
transfer to the trustee but also the validity of the testamentary gift of immovable property, as well as 
88  A. E. Von OveRbeck, “Explanatory Report …”, doc. cit., para 54.
89  Re Lord Cable [1976] 3 All ER 417 at 431; Chellaram v Chellaram [1985] 1 All ER 1043 at 1056. Cf. V. LathaM, “The 
creation and administration of a trust in the conflict of laws”, in G. W. Keeton and G. SchwaRzenbeRgeR (eds), Current Legal 
Problems, London, Stevens & Sons limited, Vol. 6, 1953, pp. 180-181, who consider that the law governing the construction of 
the will … should presumably be used to construe any trust dispositions contained in it. 
90  Wills Act 1963, chapter 44.1 (available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1963/44/enacted), which incorporates as 
part of the law of the United Kingdom the disposition of the Hague Convention on the conflicts of laws relating to the form of 
testamentary dispositions (available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=40).
91  Wills Act 1837, as amended, section 9 (available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Will4and1Vict/7/26/contents). 
92  Whicker v Hume (1858) 7 H.L.C. 124 at 143; New York Breweries Company Ltd v Att.-Gen. [1899] A.C. 62, HL; 
Finnegan v Cementation Co. Ltd [1953] 1 Q.B. 688 at 693.
93  New York Life Insurance Co v Public Trustee [1924] 2 Ch. 101 at 117; Rossano v Manufacturers’ Life Insurance Co 
[1963] 2 Q.B. 352 at 378-379.
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other important issues as the forced heirship rights94. The main consequence is that when English law 
applies the domestic law that the court of the lex situs would apply it can give rise to the renvoi.95
44. On the contrary, the validity of a testamentary gift of movable property will be governed 
by the law of the testator’s last domicile.96 When a testator dies abroad, the foreign law will be applied 
including the rules for the choice of law and, therefore, the applicable law could be either the foreign law 
if the testator is domiciled abroad or the English law when the renvoi applies.97
45. While most of the doctrine agrees to apply the foreign choice of law rules in the case of im-
movables, there are some discrepancies as far as the application of this principle in cases of movables. 
The main reason is that in the immovables the authorities of the lex situs have the physical control of the 
assets, and therefore, there is no choice for the English court, which has to do what the lex situs court 
would do. However, it does not happen with the movables since the testator’s last domicile does not 
have the same control of the assets and, consequently, the English court has fewer limitations. Therefore, 
some authors suggest that reference to the whole foreign law should apply to cases of immovables but 
not to cases of movables where the foreign law should not include its choice of law rules. In this way, 
the English court could know in advance which domestic law would apply in the foreign court avoiding 
the application of the renvoi.98  
C) Applicable law
a) The choice of law by the settlor as a general rule
46. The Hague Trusts Convention, as given effect by the Recognition of Trust Act 1987, lays 
down that “a trust shall be governed by the law chosen by the settlor”, having into account that it means 
“the rules of law in force in a State other than its rules of conflict of laws”99. For the validity of the choice 
it must be “express or be implied in the terms of the instrument creating or the writing evidencing the 
trust, interpreted, if necessary, in the light of the circumstances of the case”.100 Thus, the choice of law 
which will govern the validity of the trust can be express but also be implied whenever there is a clear 
and sufficient reference to the governing provision which can indicate the intention of the settlor.101 In 
such a case, the court will have to take into account the trust instrument or written evidence in order 
to ascertain that there is a clear intention of the settlor. Otherwise it will have to examine all circum-
stances of the case to help with the interpretation of the trust instrument.102 In testamentary trusts these 
circumstances may be inferred from the testators’ intentions and could be, for example, the residence of 
the trustees and the place of investment of the trust’s assets;103 or the situs of the assets and the place of 
administration.104 Most of the time, the courts will have to find the intention of the testator hidden in the 
factors with which the trusts have a close connection.105 
94  Earl Nelson v Lord Bridport (1846) 8 Beav. 547; Re Miller [1914] 1 Ch 511 (form of limitation of entail); Re Hernando 
(1884) 27 Ch.D. 284; and Re Ross [1930] 1 Ch 377 (forced heir of Italian immovables).
95  Re Ross [1930] Ch. 377; and Re Duke of Wellington, [1947] Ch. 506. Vid., also G. W. Keeton, “Trusts in the conflict 
of laws”, in G. W. Keeton and G. SchwaRzenbeRgeR (eds), Current Legal Problems, London, Stevens & Sons limited, Vol. 4, 
1953, pp. 116-117.
96  Thornton v Curling (1824) 8 Sim. 310; Whicker v Hume (1858) 7 H.L.C. 124; and Macdonald v Macdonald (1872) L.R. 
14 Eq. 60.
97  Re Johnson [1903] 1 Ch 821.
98  J. MowbRay et al., Lewin on Trusts, op. cit., pp. 393-394, para 11-41.
99  Hague Trusts Convention, article 17.
100  Ibid art 6.
101  A pre-Convention example of implied choice of law can be Vid., in Re Duke of Marlborough v Att.-Gen [1945] Ch. 78 
at 88-90. Vid., also V. LathaM, “The creation and administration …”, loc. cit., p. 183.
102  Tod v Barton [2002] EWHC 506 (Ch); (2001-02) 4 I.T.E.L.R 715 at 33-35.
103  Re Lord Cable [1977] 1 WLR 7.
104  A-G Campbell (1872) LR 5 HL 524.
105  Lindsay v Miller (Nº 1) [1949] VR 13.
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47. On the other hand, the chosen governing law does not have to be objectively connected with 
the trust. In this sense, it can be said that the Convention does not impose any limitation and there is a 
complete freedom to choose the governing law. This fact implies, for example, that an English settlor 
could choose a foreign law to govern the trust even whether the properties – movable or immovable – 
were located in England and the beneficiaries of the trust were English citizens domiciled in England. It 
is clear that in such a case, the English court would be bound by the foreign law chosen by the parties.106 
Nonetheless, it is debatable whether in this case the settlor would have taken the best decision 
having into account that the chosen law is not the most closely connected with the trust. Hence, for ins-
tance, where a trust concerns land it seems that the selection of the lex situs should be more appropriate 
to govern the trust since the property is more closely connected to the State where the land is located. 
That said, it is interesting to note that the proposed solution would not be the most appropriate in cases 
where the lex situs does not recognise the validity of the trust or, simply, does not regulate the figure of 
the trust – for example, the Spanish law107. 
In such a case, it can be said that there is a cross border testamentary trust by the fact that the 
settlor has chosen a foreign law to govern it. Nevertheless, some commentators have criticised this pos-
sibility and consider that the settlor should not create a conflict of laws by the mere fact of choosing a 
foreign law to govern the trust where it is a domestic trust.108   
48. Furthermore, the choice of law is subject to the mandatory rules and public policy provisions 
of the Convention. Accordingly, under certain circumstances this freedom should be limited because, 
otherwise, it could lead to the election of an inadequate law in cases in which:
(a)   the law could not be applicable due to the mandatory rules109 designated by the conflict of 
laws of the forum or its overriding rules;110 or
(b)  the chosen law is that of a State that has not adopted the Hague Trusts Convention; or 
(c)  the chosen law is that of a State that does not recognise the trust;111 or
(d)   the application of this law would be manifestly incompatible with public policy (ordre 
public).112
b) Governing law in default of choice: the most closely connected principle
 
49. In default of choice by the parties, a trust shall be governed by the law with which it is most 
closely connected, as long as the trust is valid under the referred law. The same thing happens where the 
law chosen by the settlor does not provide for trusts or the category of trust involved, since in these cases 
the choice will not be effective113. 
In ascertaining the law with which a trust is most closely connected, the Convention refers in 
particular to four factors: “(a) the place of administration of the trust designated by the settlor; (b) the 
situs of the assets of the trust; (c) the place of residence or business of the trustee and; (d) the objects of 
the trust and the places where they are to be fulfilled”.114 
No doubt, the factors mentioned in the Convention for establishing close connection to the trust 
ignore testamentary trusts where connecting factors such as nationality, domicile or habitual residence are 
106  G. ThoMaS And A. HudSon, The law of trusts, 2nd edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 1200, para 43.77. 
107  R. Lafuente Sánchez, “Cuestiones actuales sobre los trusts testamentarios y el Derecho internacional privado”, Anuario 
Español de Derecho Internacional Privado, Vol. XIV-XV, 2014-2015, pp. 547 ss.
108  Vid., J. HaRRiS, The Hague Trusts … pp. 182-183; and A. E. Von OveRbeck, “Explanatory Report …”, doc. cit., para 66. 
109  Hague Trusts Convention, art 15.
110  Ibid art 16. 
111  Ibid art 5, in conjunction with art 6, second paragraph. 
112  Ibid art 18.
113  Ibid art 6.
114  Ibid, art 7.
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of great significance115. But, on the other hand, this is not exhaustive and, therefore, the court might consi-
der other factors like the domicile or residence of the settlor, or the references to a particular law included 
in the document of trust. In addition, the court should be free to take into consideration and to weigh all 
the factors given without being influenced or limited by the order laid down by the Convention.116 
50. Nonetheless, taking into account that testamentary trusts do not frequently contain a choice 
of law clause, it is debatable whether the settlor’s domicile, which does not appear in the list of factors 
given by the Hague Trusts Convention, could be taken into account by the court as a relevant factor in 
order to probate the closest connection of the trust with the law of the settlor’s domicile. In my opinion, 
the domicile of the testator (settlor) has a clear and close connection to the trust, because this is the 
person who creates the trust and in many cases the law of the settlor’s domicile will be the law which 
governs the validity of the trust. In addition, in certain circumstances it will be easier to determine the 
domicile of the testator than to ascertain the situs of the assets or the place of administration.117 
In any case, the majority of the doctrine considers that there are four factors which have to be 
taken into consideration in order to determine the applicable law in default of choice and the settlor’s 
domicile is not there. Consequently, where the mentioned factors clearly determine the applicable law, 
the settlor’s domicile cannot be taken into account.118 
c) Trust governed by several laws
51. As happens in the law of contracts,119 The Hague Trusts Convention admits the dépécage or 
the choice – express or implied – of more than one law to govern the different aspects of the trust, par-
ticularly matters of administration.120 Thus, the settlor may select the law of the place where the trust is 
going to be administrated to govern those matters, and the law of another country –for example, the law 
of the State with which the trust is more closely connected– to govern other aspects of the trust –either 
the construction of the terms of the trusts or its validity. 
Nevertheless, some authors have argued that choosing a separate law to govern distinct aspects 
of the trust could generate more problems than benefits because it is not an easy task to define the term 
“administration”, which varies depending on the context or the duties associated with this concept. As a 
result, it is desirable to treat a trust as a unit governed by a single law.121 In addition, the right to split the 
trust could lead to the choice of the law of a non-trust State where the concept of trust is unknown, for 
example, to govern its administration, in which case it would imply more difficulties than advantages in 
order to carry out this duty.
In this sense, the Convention stipulates that “the law applicable to the validity of the trust shall 
determine whether that law or the law governing a severable aspect of the trust may be replaced by 
another law”.122 By contrast with the provisions of the Rome I Regulation,123 it is clear that the Hague 
Trusts Convention does not allow the change of applicable law at any time but provides a conflict of law 
rule to establish the validity of the change.
52. Where the law applicable to the validity of the trust is the English law, the change of the go-
verning law may occur only in cases where all the beneficiaries of the trust collectively agree to change 
115  Vid., D. Hayton, “Trusts in Private International…”, loc. cit., p. 88.
116  J. MowbRay et al., Lewin on Trusts, op. cit., pp. 406-407, para 11-67; and H. Kötz, “The Hague Convention …”, loc. 
cit., pp. 41-42.
117  Vid., J. HaRRiS, The Hague Trusts …, op. cit., pp. 225-226.
118  Vid., M. O’Sullivan, ““The Hague Convention …”, loc. cit., pp. 65-68.  
119  Rome I Convention, art 3 (1).
120  Hague Trusts Convention, art 9. Vid., a good pre-Convention example of dépécage in Re Pollak’s Estate [1937] T.P.D. 91. 
121  Vid., G. ThoMaS and A. HudSon, The law of trusts, op. cit., p. 1203, para 43.86-43.91; Dicey, MoRRiS and CollinS on the 
Conflict of Laws, op. cit., Rule 168, para 29-26; and J. HaRRiS, The Hague Trusts…, op. cit., p. 287.
122  Hague Trusts Convention, art 10.
123  Art 3 (2) of the Rome I Regulation states: The parties may at any time agree to subject the contract to a law other than 
that which previously governed it … Vid., also J. HaRRiS, The Hague Trusts…, op. cit., p. 298.
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it.124 Likewise, the governing law could be changed also in cases where there is a provision in the trust 
instrument explicitly allowing such a change.125 Finally, law can also be changed by the court insofar as 
the Variation Trusts Act 1958 allows it.126 Conversely, the governing law will not be changed just becau-
se there is a change in the place of investment of the trust property, the place of residence of the trustees, 
or the domiciles of the beneficiaries.127 In any case, mandatory provisions of the initial governing law 
will continue to apply even where the applicable law changes.128
53. On the other hand, the right to dépécage or to split the trust has some limits. First of all, the 
trust may be governed by different laws as far as they do not give rise to contradictions. Secondly, where 
a matter of the trust cannot be split, obviously the entire trust should be subjected to a single law. Finally, 
the split of the trust may not result in the non-application of the mandatory rules foreseen in The Hague 
Trusts Convention.129
d) Exclusion of renvoi
54. The law resulting from applying the Convention will be “the rules of law in force in a State 
other than its rules of conflict of laws”,130 that is to say, the substantive law with the exclusion of rules 
of conflict of laws. With this statement, the doctrine of renvoi is clearly excluded from the Convention 
in the same way that it is excluded in contracts under the Rome I Regulation131 and taking into account 
that “this solution is that of all the modern conventions”.132 Conversely, some authors have criticised this 
solution, considering that the need for renvoi has not passed133 and that this exclusion suggests that the 
governing laws shall not be applied as a judge in the foreign State would do.134 
e) Mandatory provisions, overriding provisions and public policy
55. Mandatory provisions of the State whose law has been appointed by the choice of law rules 
of the forum will be applicable insofar as they cannot be derogated from a voluntary act. This is what 
follows from the statement of the Convention when it states that: “the Convention does not prevent the 
application of provisions of the law designated by the conflicts rules of the forum, in so far as those 
provisions cannot be derogated from by voluntary act”.135 
Among the matters subject to mandatory rules established by the Convention, it is interesting 
to note the “succession rights, testate and intestate, especially the indefeasible shares of spouses and 
relatives”,136 because it directly connects the testamentary trusts and the forced heirship rights which 
exist under certain civil law legislations. 
 
56. This matter is very controversial and it is convenient to distinguish between the transfer of 
the legal title to the trustee – a matter outside the Hague Trusts Convention and, therefore, the manda-
124  Re Duke of Marlborough v A--G (N 1) [1945] Ch. 78, 85. 
125  J. MowbRay et al., Lewin on Trusts, op. cit., p. 410, para 11-74.
126  Variation Trusts Act 1958, section 1 (available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Eliz2/6-7/53/section/1).
127  Re Fitzgerald [1904] 1 Ch. 573, 588 (CA) so far as the change in the place of investment is concerned; and Re Hewitt’s 
Settlement [1915] 1 Ch. 228, 233-234, with respect to the change of the place of residence of the trustees and the change of 
domicile of the beneficiaries.
128  G. ThoMaS and A. HudSon, The law of trusts, op. cit p. 1204, para 43.95 at 43.96.
129  Vid., J. HaRRiS, The Hague Trusts…, op. cit., pp. 281-282.
130  Hague Trusts Convention, art 17. 
131  Rome I Regulation, art 20. 
132  A. E. Von oveRbeck, “Explanatory Report…”, doc. cit., p. 160. 
133  Vid.,, J. HaRRiS, The Hague Trusts…, op. cit., pp. 387-388; A BRiggS, “In praise and defence of renvoi”, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 47, 1998, p. 877; and E. RiMMell, “The place of renvoi in transnational litigation-a 
pragmatic approach to an impractical doctrine” Holdsworth Law Review, nº 19, 1998, p. 55. A good example which shows that 
renvoi has not passed is the European Union Successions Regulation that recognise renvoi under article 21.1.
134  Vid., J. HaRRiS, The Hague Trusts…, op. cit., p. 190. 
135  Hague Trusts Convention, art 15. 
136  Ibid, at paragraph (c).
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tory rules should not be applied – and the creation of the trust itself, which is a matter falling within the 
Convention and, consequently, restricted by the mandatory rules of forced heirship rights.137 Thus, as 
explained earlier, forced heirship rights claims to movables will be governed by the law of the testator’s 
domicile at death, while in the case of immovables it will be governed by the lex situs.   
From the English law viewpoint the transfer of property to trustees is considered as an intervivos 
transfer of property, therefore, a preliminary issue governed by the lex situs and not by the lex succes-
sionis. Consequently, such a transfer is valid since the Convention cannot prevent the transfer of title to 
property in so far as cannot be derogated from by voluntary act.138
As far as forced heirship provisions are concerned, they fall outside the Convention since may 
be considered as a preliminary issue subject to the lex successionis. Nevertheless, they could impede 
the launch of the trust in so far as the property of the deceased person is subject to the forced heirship 
rights claims.139
57. Besides, the Hague Trusts Convention protects the application of the mandatory rules of the 
law of the forum “which must be applied even to international situations, irrespective of rules of conflict 
of laws”.140 It refers to overriding provisions, some times called lois de police –laws protecting public 
health, cultural heritage of the country, certain vital economic interests, or the protection of interests of 
the weaker contracting parties in a contract–,141 which cannot be derogated and which will be applied 
irrespective of the law governing the trust. 
 In exceptional circumstances, the lois de police of another State which has a sufficiently close 
connection with the case may apply. However, this provision may create uncertainties and the United 
Kingdom made a reservation to avoid the application of such paragraph.142 
Where domestic mandatory rules foreseen under article 15 and international mandatory rules 
predicted under article 16 conflict it has to be assumed that international mandatory rules will prevail 
over domestic ones.
58. Last, but not least, where the application of any or all provisions of the Convention would 
be manifestly incompatible with public policy (ordre public) they will be disregarded.143 Obviously, this 
provision refers to the forum’s public policy and, consequently, this provision has to be interpreted in a 
restrictive way and after applying the possibilities foreseen under articles 4, 13, 15 and 16; otherwise, 
the Convention could be adversely affected. In addition, it is noteworthy that the expression ordre public 
which contains the Convention in brackets at the end of article 18 has not been included in the Recog-
nition of Trusts Act 1987, where only the term public policy appears. According to some authors it is a 
clear sign of the restrictive way in which this article should be applied, since the doctrine of ordre public 
in continental legal systems has a wider meaning than the doctrine of public policy under the English 
law144 where some examples of public policy might be: discriminatory rules, rules violating human 
rights,145 or oppressive foreign exchange control legislation.146Thus, as Professor D. Hayton states “the 
137  J. haRRiS, The Hague Trusts…, op. cit., pp 54-55.
138  D. Hayton, “Trusts in Private International …”, loc. cit., p. 92. Vid., Gorjat v Gorjat [2010] EWHC 1537 (Ch) at [8]
139  Vid., D. Hayton, “Trusts in Private International …”, loc.cit., p. 91. Vid., Casani v Mattei (1998/1999) 1 ITELR 925 at 
947; and Re Annesley [1926] Ch 692.
140  Hague Trusts Convention, art 16. 
141  Vid., Dicey, MoRRiS and CollinS on The Conflict of Laws, op. cit., Rule 168, para 29-032; and A. E. Von oveRbeck, 
“Explanatory Report …”, doc. cit., para 149. 
142  Hague Trusts Convention, article 16.
143  Ibid art 18.
144  Vid., J. HaRRiS, The Hague Trusts…, op. cit., pp. 391-392, quoting A. E. Anton (with P. R. BeauMont), Private 
International Law: A Treatise from the standpoint of Scots Law, 2nd edn, Edinburgh, W Green, p. 641.
145  Oppenheimer v Cattermole [1976] A.C. 249 (H.L.); William & Humbert Ltd. v W. & H. Trade Marks (Jersey) Ltd [1986] 
A.C. 368 HL .
146  Re Helbert Wagg & Co. Ltd [1956] Ch. 323 at 351; The Playa Larga [1983] 2 LLoys’s Rep. 171 at 190, CA. Vid., J 
Mowbray et al., supra n 20, 415 at 416, para 11–83.
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fact that a local civil law does not know the trust institution as such does not entitle the Convention to 
be negated by article 18”147
59. To conclude, attention should be given to the inter-relationship between the mandatory pro-
visions under article 15, for example the forced heirship rules, and the public policy considered under 
article 18 of the Convention, as it is debatable whether the English court could apply article 18 to matters 
affected by article 15. An example is a testamentary trust governed by English which infringes the forced 
heirship rights rules of Spain where the testator is domiciled. In this case, should the English court apply 
the Spanish mandatory rules or, on the contrary, can the English court declare that the Spanish forced 
heirship rules are incompatible with English public policy? Generally speaking, public policy rules 
prevail on mandatory provisions but the English court should not disregard the application of Spanish 
mandatory rules because they differ from English law148.      
f) Forced heirship rights and the applicable law
60. As pointed out above, article 15 of The Hague Trusts Convention contains mandatory rules. 
This provision is dealing with matters other than trust, as for example, forced heirship rights which are 
considered a matter of succession and have to be governed by the lex succesionis instead of the law 
applicable to the trust. 
6l. According to this article, the English court has to give effect to the succession rights, that 
is to say, the forced heirship rights governed by the law which the conflict of law rules have identified 
instead of applying the law designated by the Hague Trusts Convention to govern the trust questions. 
Thus, where the lex successionis applicable to the transfer of estates to a trust is the law of a civil law 
country which includes forced heirship provisions, for example the Spanish law, then the English court 
will enforce them and the trust will take effect after the application of forced heirship rules. Otherwise, 
the trust would be void or should be reduced in order to clawback the portion that the testator cannot be 
freely disposed by the will. Therefore, the forced heirship rights may question the validity of the trust 
and can constitute a problem because of the clawback feature;149 in short, they may limit the application 
of testamentary trusts. 
62. On the contrary, where the lex successionis is the law of a common law country which does 
not recognise the forced heirship rights, for example the English law, then neither the English court nor 
the foreign court could enforce them since the forced heirship rights constitute an internal mandatory 
rule but not an international mandatory rule. It means that the ordre public dispositions of the lex fori 
cannot be invoked to limit the freedom of testation nor the creation of the trust.150
g) Scope of application of the governing law
63. The Hague Trusts Convention and the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 describe what specific 
matters the applicable law of a trust shall govern. Thus, “the validity of the trust, its construction, its 
effects, and administration of the trust”151. By contrast, case law in common law before the Recognition 
147  D. Hayton, “Trusts in Private International …”, loc. cit., p. 94.
148  R. Lafuente Sánchez, “Cuestiones actuales sobre los trusts testamentarios …”, loc. cit., pp. 552-555.
149  A. BRaun, “Italy”, in J. GlaSSon and G. W. ThoMaS (eds), The international trust, 2nd edn, Bristol, Jordans, 2006, p. 813; 
A. DuckwoRth, “Forced heirship and the trust”, in J. GlaSSon and G. W. ThoMaS (eds), The international trust, 2nd edn, Bristol, 
Jordans, 2006, Chapter 14, p. 711; D. Hayton, “Forced heirship and the trust” in D. Hayton (ed), The international trust, 3rd 
edn, Bristol, Jordans, 2011, p. 714; and J. CaRRaScoSa González, El Reglamento sucesorio… op. cit., pp. 255-256.
150  Thus, for example, the Spanish Supreme Court Decision on 23 October 1992 (STS 7926/1992), which declared that the 
forced heirship rights constitute an “internal order public principle”. Vid., J. CaRRaScoSa González El Reglamento sucesorio… 
op. cit., p. 255, and J. C. FeRnández RozaS and S. Sánchez LoRenzo, Derecho internacional …, op. cit., p. 157. 
151  Hague Trusts Convention, art 8.
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of Trusts Act 1987 states that the law applicable to the trust governs the material or essential validity of 
the trust,152 its interpretation,153 and its effects.154
h) Multi-legal system states
64. According to the Hague Trusts Convention, the applicable law must be that which is in 
force in the territorial unit in question. Therefore, “… where a State comprises several territorial units 
each of which has its own rules of law in respect of trusts, any reference to the law of that State is to be 
construed as referring to the law in force in the territorial unit in question”155. This provision has not 
been scheduled to the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987. As a result, the Convention shall apply to trusts 
governed by English law. 
In addition, “A State within which different territorial units have their own rules of law in res-
pect of trusts is not bound to apply the Convention to conflicts solely between the laws of such units”. 156 
Nevertheless, in the case of the United Kingdom it can be said that the Convention will apply because: 
a)   the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 extends the provisions of the Convention “not only in 
relation to the trusts described in Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention but also in relation to 
any other trusts of property arising under the law of any part of the United Kingdom”157 and, 
b)   the mentioned Act extends the meaning of State in article 17 “to any country or territory 
(whether or not a party to the Convention and whether or not forming part of the United 
Kingdom) which has its own system of law”.158  
D) Recognition of trusts
65. Where the trust is valid, because it has been created in accordance with the law specified by 
the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 and The Hague Trusts Convention to which it gives effect, the conse-
quence is that it must be recognised as a trust. The recognition shall imply, as a minimum, “that the trust 
property constitutes a separate fund, that the trustee may sue and be sued in his capacity as trustee, and 
that he may appear or act in this capacity before a notary or any person acting in an official capacity”. 159 
In any case, the recognition of a trust as foreseen under the Convention is subject to the fulfilment 
of the mandatory, overriding and public policy rules as explained earlier. On the contrary, the Convention 
permits that the States may refuse to recognize a trust since, “No State shall be bound to recognise a trust 
the significant elements of which, except for the choice of the applicable law, the place of administration 
and the habitual residence of the trustee, are more closely connected with States which do not have the 
institution of the trust or the category of trust involved”.160 Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the 
United Kingdom has not adopted this article under the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 because it is con-
sidered that there are enough protections for States’ legitimate interests in articles 15, 16 and 18.161
66. On the other hand, the Convention “shall not prevent the application of rules of law more 
favourable to the recognition of trusts”.162 The main consequence of this provision is that the English 
152  Lindsay v Miller [1949] V.L.R. 13; Augustus v Permanent Trustee Co (Camberra) Ltd (1971) 124 C.L.R. 245.
153  Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd v Roberts [1970] V.R. 732.
154  Re Fitzgerald [1904] 1 Ch. 573 (CA); Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd v Margottini [1960] V.R. 415. Vid., Dicey, 
MoRRiS and CollinS on The Conflict of Laws, op. cit., Rule 169, para 29-051.
155  Hague Trusts Convention, art 23.
156  Ibid art 24.
157  Recognition of Trusts Act 1987, section 1 (2).
158  Ibid section 1 (4).
159  Hague Trusts Convention, art 11.
160  Ibid art 13.
161  d. hayton, “Trusts in Private International …” loc. cit., p. 89.
162  Hague Trusts Convention, art 14.
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common law conflict rules shall apply to the extent that they are more favourable than the rules of the 
Convention. Thus, for example, the rule that extends the recognition to the trusts to any other trusts of 
property arising under the law of any part of the United Kingdom or by virtue of a judicial decision 
whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. 
V. Concluding remarks
67. The trust is a common law legal concept that does not exist in the majority of civil law juris-
dictions. Testamentary trusts are express private trusts created by the testator in the will to provide the 
benefits of property after his or her death. Its introduction in civil law jurisdictions is a difficult matter 
as well as a controversial issue which has generated a large discussion which is still going on, especially 
because there are some legal concepts, as the forced heirship rights, which makes the implementation 
and recognition of the trust institution under civil law jurisdictions difficult. The situation, nevertheless, 
could change in the coming years since many authors in civil jurisdictions recognise the modern utility 
of the trust. Further, there are new projects that may contribute to the increasing international develop-
ment of this figure and its acceptance in civil law jurisdictions, for instance, the Draft Common Frame 
of Reference (DCFR), which contains Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law 
and intends to provide Europe with a uniform trust law. 
Nevertheless, some authors have criticized the inconsistencies that presents the treatment of 
trusts in the DCFR and argue that the proposed trust model is not the best solution for Europe. Thus, 
some of them believe that this instrument has tried to create a new European model of trust influenced 
by a “continental” approach which may be alien to the existing concept in common law countries163. In 
addition, it is not clear if jurisdictions which already have trust law could benefit from the DCFR rules 
having into account that, in the absence of European harmonised conflict of law rules for trust, the adop-
tion of the DCFR involves a new legal framework and may contribute to generate even more comple-
xity to the currently applicable legal framework164. Finally, as far as testamentary trusts are concerned, 
the transplant of the DCFR trust provisions into civilian legal systems, where the trusts is an unknown 
institution, may enter into conflict to national laws of those countries where provisions in family or suc-
cession matters may take precedence over the law governing the trust165.
68. Accordingly, the ignorance of trusts in domestic civil law jurisdictions is an important boun-
dary when applying the conflict of law rules to cross-border testamentary trusts. As far as jurisdiction is 
concerned, the trusts are partially excluded from the scope of the European Union Successions Regula-
tion, particularly all the questions relating to the creation, administration and dissolution of trusts. Besi-
des, the Regulation does not include rules of jurisdiction for that matter. Therefore, in order to determine 
the jurisdiction of cross-border testamentary trusts, the Recast Regulation will apply with respect to the 
external relationships of the trust, for instance, the disputes arising between the trustee and persons other 
than beneficiaries. 
69. Regarding the applicable law, the Rome I Regulation does not apply to testamentary trusts, 
but the Rome II Regulation will apply to non-voluntary trusts as well as all those trusts of property ari-
sing under the law of any part of the United Kingdom. On the other hand, The Hague Trusts Convention 
163  Vid., A. BRaun, “Trusts in the Draft Common Frame of Reference: the best solution for Europe?”, Cambridge Law 
Journal, nº 70 (2), July 2011, pp. 338, 339, 349; L. RichaRdSon, “The DCFR, anyone?”, The Journal Online (available at 
http://www.journalonline.co.uk/Magazine/59-1/1013494.aspx; W. SagaeRt, “The Trust Book in the DCFR: A civil lawyer’s 
perspective”, in S. Van eRP, A. SaloMonS and B. AkkeRManS (Dir.) The Future of European Property Law, München, Sellier 
European Law Publishers, 2012, pp. 31-46; and W. Swadling, “The DCFR Trust: A Common Law Perspective”, in S. Van eRP, 
A. SaloMonS and B. AkkeRManS, The Future of European Property Law, München, Sellier European Law Publishers, 2012, 
pp. 21-30.
164  A. BRaun, “Trusts in the Draft Common Frame …”, loc. cit., p. 344.
165  A. BRaun, “Trusts in the Draft Common Frame …”, loc. cit., pp. 345-346.
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and the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987 serves the important purpose of unifying the law applicable to 
trusts and represents a vital commencement between legal cultures in an agreement on trust law. Hen-
ce, the Hague Trusts Convention will be applicable to voluntary trusts, that is to say, to cross-border 
testamentary trusts. However, in the sphere of the European Union, only Italy, Netherlands, Malta and 
Luxembourg have ratified the Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition, 
while Cyprus and France have signed the Convention but not yet ratified it. It means that the majority of 
the continental European legal systems contains no specific rules relating to trusts and do not provide an 
appropriate and satisfactory solution in matters dealing with testamentary trusts.
70. To conclude, in order to avoid the obstacles arising in the application of the conflict of laws 
rules, I consider necessary to carry out an approach between the common law and the civil law systems. 
In this sense, waiting what the future holds for the Draft Common Frame of Reference, the introduction 
and recognition of the trust into the conflict of law rules of civil states, by signing and ratifying the Ha-
gue Trusts Convention, could be a first step toward achieving this objective. In my opinion, academics 
and practitioners, we should foster this proposal since it would allow to introduce specific conflict of 
laws rules for testamentary trusts into the domestic systems of these countries applying, when necessary, 
the mandatory provisions as foreseen in the Convention in order to ensure the application of the forced 
heirship rights.
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